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This paper investigates the effects of services offshoring on wages using individual level data 
combined with industry information on offshoring. Our results show that services offshoring 
affects the real wage of low and medium skilled individuals negatively. By contrast, skilled 
workers benefit from services offshoring in terms of higher real wages. Hence, offshoring has 
contributed to a widening of the wage gap between skilled and less skilled workers. This result 
is obtained while controlling for individual and sectoral observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity. In particular, our empirical model also controls for the impact of technological 
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Offshoring of services activities from industrialised countries, and the resulting impact on domestic labour 
markets, is a topical issue, both in academic discourse and public debate.  Within Europe, the UK is 
particularly prominent, perhaps because the trend to offshore services has started earlier than in many 
continental European countries.  Still, evidence on labour market effects of such offshoring activities is 
scant and the conclusion that may be drawn from the work so far is that there is little to worry about for 
domestic workers, although, the literature thus far focuses on the quantity of labour (employment), not the 
price (wages).  However, standard theory reminds us that an adjustment in the labour market to offshoring 
can go through either quantity or the price of labour, or both.  In this case, concluding on the benevolent 
(or otherwise) effects of offshoring purely on the basis of an analysis of the quantity of labour can be 
misleading.   
We investigate the effect of offshoring of services activities on individual workers’ wages.  To do so, we 
use household level panel data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and combine these with 
industry level measures of offshoring of services inputs over the period 1992 to 2004.  Hence, our 
approach allows us to estimate the effect of increasing offshoring activities in an industry on individual 
wages of workers working in the affected industry.  To identify the effects, we allow for observed and 
unobserved worker level heterogeneity, using the detailed information provided in the household panel 
data, and also control for technological change, and offshoring of tangible (material) inputs in the industry. 
Our results show that services offshoring affects the real wage of low and medium skilled individuals 
negatively. By contrast, skilled workers benefit from services offshoring in terms of higher real wages. 
Hence, offshoring has contributed to a widening of the wage gap between skilled and less skilled workers.  
To judge the economic significance of our estimates we engage in a thought experiment of implied wage 
changes. Over the full sample period, services offshoring increased by 1.57 percentage points, while the 
increase for materials offshoring was at 0.46 percentage points. For a worker with the average number of 
working hours this implies that the cumulative increase in wages due to offshoring for high skilled workers 
was GBP 1,152, and this is entirely due to offshoring of services inputs. For low skilled workers, the 
equivalent reduction in wages was GBP 253, GBP 176 of which were due to services offshoring and the 
remainder due to materials offshoring. Given that these are effects of cumulative changes of offshoring 
over a ten year period these numbers are small, but not so small as to be neglected. It also shows that the 
economic implications of services offshoring on wages have been much stronger than those of material 
offshoring. 
Hence, we have identified winners and losers in terms of wage gains from services offshoring. The policy 
relevant question is now whether the losers should be compensated and, if this is answered in the 
affirmative, what form such a compensation should have. Another policy implication is that skill upgrading 
needs to be continued in order to allow unskilled workers to move into the "winning" category of skilled 
work. 
 1 Introduction
O®shoring of services activities from industrialised countries, and the resulting impact on
domestic labour markets, is a topical issue, both in academic discourse and public debate.
In a recent study, Blinder (2007) looks carefully at characteristics of occupations with a view
to their potential o®shorability. Based on his data he estimates that around 25 per cent of
all US jobs can potentially be relocated to other countries, as they do not involve much
personal contact. It is, of course, important to keep in mind that he only comes up with the
number of jobs that are potentially o®shorable, while he does not give any estimate as to
the number of jobs that may actually be relocated in the future. Thinking more about the
actual number of jobs, several scholars have investigated the impact of o®shoring on actual
employment levels or growth. For the US, for example, Amiti and Wei (2007) estimate
industry level labour demand equations for US industries where they use actual o®shoring
of services as an explanatory variable. They ¯nd little evidence of reductions in employment
following increased levels of services o®shoring.
The US is, of course, not the only country where o®shoring is hotly debated. Many
observers in Europe also join in the discussion. Here, the UK is particularly prominent,
perhaps because the trend to o®shore services has started earlier than in many continental
European countries. Still, evidence on labour market e®ects of such o®shoring activities is
scant. Amiti and Wei (2005), similar to their study for the US, conclude that there have
been little e®ects of o®shoring on employment. Their analysis is based on estimating labour
demand equations using industry data for the UK. Using highly disaggregated ¯rm level data
on job creation and destruction, and ¯rm level data on trade in services, Hijzen et al. (2007)
also fail to ¯nd any negative e®ects of services o®shoring (measured as services imports).
By contrast, they ¯nd that, on average, ¯rms that start o®shoring services experience faster
employment growth than other comparable ¯rms.
Hence, the conclusion that may be drawn from the work so far is that there is little to
worry about for domestic workers, although, the literature thus far focuses on the quantity
of labour not at the price. However, standard theory reminds us that an adjustment in the
labour market to o®shoring can go through either quantity or the price of labour, or both.
In this case, concluding on the benevolent (or otherwise) e®ects of o®shoring purely on the
basis of an analysis of the quantity of labour can be misleading. Especially in a country
1with °exible labour markets such as the US or the UK a full labour market picture of the
e®ects of o®shoring of services needs to look at the price of work as well. This is the gap we
¯ll in this paper.
We investigate the e®ect of o®shoring of services activities on individual workers wages.
To do so, we use household level panel data from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and combine these with industry level measures of o®shoring of services inputs
over the period 1992 to 2004. Hence, our approach allows us to estimate the e®ect of
increasing o®shoring activities in an industry on individual wages of workers working in
the a®ected industry. To identify the e®ects, we allow for observed and unobserved worker
level heterogeneity, using the detailed information provided in the household panel data,
and also control for technological change, and o®shoring of tangible (material) inputs in the
industry.1
The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. It is the ¯rst analysis
we are aware of that looks at the wage e®ects of services o®shoring using individual level
data. This is a highly policy relevant issue and deserves of detailed inspection. The use
of household panel data allows us to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity,
avoiding aggregation bias that may hamper more aggregate studies. Also, it allows to clearly
identify the winners and losers from this form of globalisation. Second, the combination of
household level data for wages and industry level data for services o®shoring mitigates
concerns about the possible endogeneity of o®shoring. However, we explicitly test for the
exogeneity of our services o®shoring variable. A third contribution of our paper lies in the
utilisation of data from the United Kingdom, where o®shoring of services has attracted
much attention in the academic literature and the popular debate. It is also a country with
relatively °exible labour markets where much of the adjustment in labour to the process of
o®shoring may be expected through the price of labour, and not just through the quantity.
Our results show that services o®shoring a®ects the real wage of low and medium skilled
individuals negatively. By contrast, skilled workers bene¯t from services o®shoring in terms
of higher real wages. Hence, o®shoring has contributed to a widening of the wage gap be-
tween skilled and less skilled workers. This result is obtained while controlling for individual
and sectoral observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, our empirical model also
1These variables have been shown to a®ect the relative wages of skilled workers, see, e.g., Feenstra and
Hanson (1999), Hijzen et al. (2005).
2controls for the impact of technological change and o®shoring of materials.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data on
o®shoring of both services and materials. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology
and Section 4 presents the results. Some concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 Service o®shoring in the UK
The measurement of o®shoring, either services or materials is not straightforward and is
greatly limited by data availability of coherent and comparable (across sectors and or coun-
tries) information on such activities. Hence, trade economists usually revert to measuring
trade in intermediates as a proxy. We follow this approach here. Still, data on trade in inter-
mediates are also di±cult to come by. Amiti and Wei (2007) calculate trade in intermediates
by measuring the importance of intermediates in a sector using data from input-output ta-
bles and combine it with data on imports (which do not distinguish ¯nal and intermediate
goods) from o±cial trade statistics.2 They cannot observe the actual proportion of im-
ported inputs. The implicit assumption in this de¯nition is that imports are used as inputs
in the same proportion as domestic inputs. This, however, could be problematic if, e.g., an
industry uses di®erent types of inputs from domestic and foreign sources. Our de¯nition
of o®shoring is a more direct measure of imported services inputs. Speci¯cally, we derive
data on imported services inputs directly from national accounts' input-output supply tables
provided by UK National Statistics for the years 1992 to 2004.3





with ISit denoting all imported services and Y representing the production value of
industry i in period t. Information on both IS and Y is directly observable in the supply
and use tables. 4
For materials o®shoring we have to also draw on international trade data as the available
2This follows the de¯nition of materials o®shoring used by Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
3UK National Statistics, Input-Output, Supply and Use Tables, August 2006.
4It would be interesting to investigate to which countries services are o®shored. However, this is not
possible to determine with the data from the supply and use tables.
3detailed input-output use tables do not di®erentiate between imported and domestically
supplied materials.5 Thus, we look at aggregate imports of manufactured goods and allocate
them according to their use share in domestic industries based on aggregate input-output
use tables. Conceptionally, our materials o®shoring measure is therefore in line with the
narrow outsourcing measure in Feenstra and Hanson (1999).





with IMPi¤t denoting imported intermediate inputs from the same respective foreign
industry i¤. ­ii¤t denotes the share of domestic and foreign inputs from a industry i that
are consumed in industry i.6
Figure 1 looks at the development of the two o®shoring measures over time as a man-
ufacturing average. What is noteworthy is the tremendous increase in services o®shoring
since the late 1990's. By contrast, although materials o®shoring has grown steadily since
the early 1990's its overall growth rate is approximately only slightly above half of that for
service o®shoring (37 vs. 67 percent).7
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the measures of services and materials
o®shoring for our particular BHPS sample used in the econometric analysis below, which
takes the industrial composition of our micro data into account. The average intensity of
o®shoring materials is 5.0 percent, while that of services o®shoring is 2.6 percent. There is a
fairly high standard deviation around this mean, which is due not only to variation between
but also within industries. In other words, o®shoring ratios in industries show considerable
variation over time, which can be exploited in the econometric analysis below.
3 Methodology and data
To assess the impact of o®shoring activity in an industry on individual wages we estimate
simple Mincer human capital wage equations of the form
5This is a common problem, e.g. US input output tables su®er from the same shortcoming.
6Note that
PI
i=1 ­ii¤t = 1 only if industries I contains agriculture, services, private and public con-
sumption, inventories, capital formation and exports.
7These ¯gures for services o®shoring and its upward trend are broadly in line with Amiti and Wei (2005).
4logwijt = ® + ¯Xit + °Yjt + ¸SOSSjt + ¸MOSMjt + Tj + ¹t + ®i + ¶j + ²ijt; (3)
where wijt is the hourly wage of worker i in industry j at time t, de¯ned as average
hourly gross labour earnings including bonuses, premia and other extra payments over the
year preceding the respective interview month. Xit is a vector of standard demographic
and human capital variables which includes age, age squared, dummies for the presence of
children and being married, job tenure, tenure squared, an indicator variable for high edu-
cation, dummies for occupation using the nine main categories of the ISCO code, dummies
for ¯rm size and regional dummies. Year e®ects, ¹t; and individual speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, ®i,
are also controlled for. In addition we include industry dummies ¶j, and to control for time
varying industry characteristics we also enter industry output, Yjt, the ratio of industry level
R&D to output, and industry speci¯c time trends Tj in the model. The inclusion of R&D
and industry speci¯c time trends controls for industry speci¯c technological progress. The
main explanatory variable of interest, of course, are the variables for services and material
o®shoring, OSSjt and OSMjt.
All the regressions are weighted using the standard sampling weights from the household
data to adjust for individual sampling probabilities. Finally a methodological point should
be mentioned. In the wage equation (1) we estimate the e®ect of an aggregate variable (i.e.
outsourcing at the industry level) on wages of individual workers, so the standard errors
of the estimated coe±cients may be biased downwards as indicated in Moulton (1990).
Accordingly, we adjust standard errors allowing for contemporaneous correlation within two
digit industries as has become standard in the literature.
We measure wages and worker characteristics using individual level data from the British
household panel survey (BHPS) for the period 1992 - 2004. The annual survey, which started
in 1991, is based on a nationally representative sample of households. Individuals are fol-
lowed over time. The database provides data on wages and education levels, as well as many
individual characteristics which are included in our empirical model to control for observed
individual level heterogeneity. Table2 provides descriptive statistics for our explanatory
variables. In the estimation, we restrict our sample to male prime age individuals (i.e., 18
to 65 year old) working in manufacturing.
5Our unbalanced sample covers 997 individuals yielding 5775 observations. In order to
avoid selection bias with respect to item non-response that might be non-random each
explanatory variable was supplemented with a dummy for missing values. Subsequently,
missing values where recoded to zero and the generated dummies for missing values also act
as regressors in the model.
A particular focus of our analysis lies on skill speci¯c e®ects of o®shoring. We follow the
International Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED) and di®erentiate between high-
skilled workers (ED : High), medium-skilled workers (ED : Med) and low-skilled workers
(ED : low) according to the grouping presented in Table 3. To estimate skill speci¯c e®ects
we interact the o®shoring variables with dummies for the three skill categories.
Figure 2 provides some evidence on the development of the median wage rate and the
10th and 90th percentile for the three di®erent skill groups between 1992 to 2004. Note
that wages for all three groups increased over time. The trends for all three skill groups
have been fairly consistent over time. In particular, they do not show any obvious break
since the late 1990s when services o®shoring increased. Of course, this simple eye balling of
the graphs does not control for other factors impacting on wages. Hence, in order to check
more formally whether o®shoring a®ects wages we now turn to estimating equation (1) in
the next section.
4 Estimation results
Table 4 presents the regression results. Inspection of column (1) shows that services o®-
shoring has a negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ect on individual level wages. In other
words, workers in industries with increasing levels of services o®shoring are likely to ex-
perience reductions in their wage, conditional on all variables included in the model. The
magnitude of the coe±cient suggests that a one percentage point increase in the services
o®shoring intensity of the industry leads to a 0.7 per cent reduction in real wages.
Column (2) shows results which also include the intensity of material o®shoring in the
industry. This is included for two reasons. First, it allows us to see whether the estimated
coe±cient is robust to this inclusion in that it does not just re°ect an industry's propensity to
o®shore in general. Second, it also enables us to distinguish the relative magnitude of services
and material o®shoring for wage changes. The results show that, ¯rstly, the coe±cient on
6services o®shoring is indeed robust; it does not change much in either statistical signi¯cance
or magnitude. Comparing the estimate with the coe±cient for material o®shoring shows that
the marginal e®ect of services o®shoring is roughly similar to that of materials o®shoring.
Increases by one per centage point in both types is associated with decreases in real wages
of just under one per cent.8
Of course, the estimations thus far assume that the e®ect of o®shoring on wages is the
same across education groups. This is unlikely to be a reasonable assumption. If industries
o®shore mainly low skilled services and material activities abroad, then we may expect a
negative e®ect on unskilled workers but not on high skilled workers.9 In order to investigate
this we, in column (3) report results of an estimation in which we interact the two o®shoring
variables with dummy variables for individuals in three di®erent skill groups, namely, low,
medium and high skilled. As the results show, the negative coe±cients of services o®shoring
are statistically signi¯cant only for low and medium skilled workers. For material o®shoring,
we also ¯nd that wages for these two types of workers are statistically signi¯cantly negatively
a®ected. This suggests that industries o®shore low to medium skilled manufacturing and
services activities. As for high skilled workers, we ¯nd that their wages are positive associated
with increased services o®shoring, but not with material o®shoring.
A noteworthy aspect of this regression is that the coe±cient on material and services
o®shoring for low and medium skilled workers are quite similar. In fact, testing the equality
of coe±cients does not allow us to reject the null that they are equal.10 Hence, the marginal
e®ects of the two types of o®shoring are similar for low skilled individuals. Furthermore,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe±cient on services o®shoring is the same for
low and medium skilled workers,11 although the marginal e®ect of materials o®shoring is
di®erent for these two types of workers.12
An important assumption implicit in our estimation thus far is that of exogeneity of
regressors. This may be questionable in particular with respect to the o®shoring variables.
These may be endogenous due to reverse causality - industries with unskill intensive produc-
8We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coe±cients are equal.
9To be precise, we would expect a decrease in the relative wage of unskilled workers on the basis of a
simple modi¯cation of a Heckscher-Ohlin model which accommodates trade in intermediates (e.g., Feenstra
and Hanson, 1999). Whether or not the real wage of unskilled workers also falls is not clear in such a set up.
However, it is still reasonable to assume that the e®ects on real wages are di®erent for the two skill groups.
10F test, p-value of 0.203 and 0.473, respectively for medium and low skilled workers.
11F test, p-value of 0.451.
12F test, p-value of 0.017.
7tion (and low wages for unskilled workers) may also be those that are more likely to o®shore.
In this case our conclusions based on the estimations thus far would be problematic. We
have three responses to this concern. First, given that there is substantial heterogeneity in
individual wages the described scenario, that variation in individual wages causes industry
level o®shoring, is unlikely. Second, we control for industry level ¯xed e®ects which would
control for time invariant characteristics, such as production technology, of the di®erent in-
dustries. Third, we explicitly tested the assumption of exogeneity of the o®shoring variables
using a C-test, based on a re-estimation of the equations in columns (1) to (3) using an in-
strumental variable GMM approach. The endogenous variables are the respective o®shoring
variables and excluded instruments are their lags, lags of total services o®shoring as well as
the lag of a "wide" de¯nition of materials o®shoring.13 The test statistics are reported at
the bottom of Table 4. They show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument
validity (Hansen J statistic). Neither can we reject the assumption of exogeneity of the
variables in question from the C test.
To judge the economic signi¯cance of our estimates we engage in a thought experiment of
implied wage changes. Table 5 reports the median hourly wages for the three skill groups in
1992, the beginning of our sample period. We also report the coe±cients from the estimation
of the preferred speci¯cation in column (6) of Table 4. Over the full sample period, services
o®shoring increased by 1.57 percentage points, while the increase for materials o®shoring
was at 0.46 percentage points. For a worker with the average number of working hours
(1,732 per year for the UK, see OECD, 2008) this implies that the cumulative increase in
wages due to o®shoring for high skilled workers was GBP 1,152, and this is entirely due
to o®shoring of services inputs. For low skilled workers, the equivalent reduction in wages
was GBP 253, GBP 176 of which were due to services o®shoring and the remainder due to
materials o®shoring. Given that these are e®ects of cumulative changes of o®shoring over a
ten year period these numbers are small, but not so small as to be neglected. It also shows
that, even though regression coe±cients are similar, the economic implications of services
o®shoring on wages have been much stronger than those of material o®shoring.14
13Wide o®shoring is de¯ned by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). It captures intermediate material inputs that
are imported from other industries than the own industry.
14A potential question regarding our estimations is how robust this is to the de¯nition of skills we use.
As an alternative, we use a skill de¯nition based on occupations, information on which is in the BHPS. We
classify individuals into high, medium and low skilled occupations. The results based on this approach are
comparable to the estimates reported here in terms of signs, statistical signi¯cance and magnitude for low
and medium skilled workers. One notable di®erence is that we now do not ¯nd any statistically signi¯cant
85 Conclusion
This paper looks at the relationship between o®shoring of services and individual workers
wages, using household level panel data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
combined with industry level measures of o®shoring of services activities over the period
1992 to 2004. Our results show that services o®shoring a®ects the real wage of low and
medium skilled individuals negatively. By contrast, skilled workers bene¯t from services
o®shoring in terms of higher real wages. Hence, o®shoring has contributed to a widening of
the wage gap between skilled and less skilled workers. However, looking at the magnitude of
these e®ects we ¯nd that they are rather small, but not so small as to be negligible. Hence,
we have identi¯ed winners and losers in terms of wage gains from services o®shoring. The
policy relevant question is now whether the losers should be compensated and, if this is
answered in the a±rmative, what form such a compensation should have. Another policy
implication is that skill upgrading needs to be continued in order to allow unskilled workers
to move into the "winning" category of skilled work.
e®ect of services o®shoring on high skilled workers. However, the main message still holds: services o®shoring
a®ects low and medium skilled workers di®erently than high skilled workers, and the economic signi¯cance
of services o®shoring is much higher than that of materials o®shoring. Results are not reported here to save
space, but can be obtained upon request.
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11Table 1: O®shoring within sample
Mean Standard
Deviation
OSS overall 2.5545 3.2791
between 2.9283
within 1.6070
OSM overall 4.9043 3.3855
between 2.8385 N=5775
within 1.9771 n=997
Table 2: Summary Statistics
l
Mean Standard Deviation
Hourly Wage 9.12 5.20
Age : 18 ¡ 25 0.11 0.32
Age : 26 ¡ 35 0.26 0.44
Age : 36 ¡ 50 0.43 0.49
Married : Dummy 0.65 0.48




Tenure : noresponse 0.10 0.30
ISCED: high 0.43 0.49
ISCED: med 0.34 0.47
FirmSize :< 25 0.18 0.39
FirmSize : 25 ¡ 100 0.22 0.42
FirmSize : 100 ¡ 1000 0.47 0.50
Firm : public 0.00 0.06
Firm : unknownowner 0.00 0.01
Industry : Output 29.14 16.62
Industry : R&D=Y 2.36 2.81
Table 3: Skill Grouping
High-Skilled Second stage of tertiary education
Medium-Skilled Upper-secondary education
Post-secondary but non-tertiary education




12Table 4: Regression Results
I II III
Age : 18 ¡ 25 -0.0506 -0.0492 -0.0481
[1.33] [1.29] [1.24]
Age : 26 ¡ 35 0.0414 0.0423 0.0407
[1.24] [1.26] [1.21]
Age : 36 ¡ 50 0.0531 0.0534 0.0538
[2.01]* [2.03]* [2.03]*
Married : Dummy 0.0241 0.0245 0.0242
[1.08] [1.10] [1.11]
Children : Dummy 0.0273 0.0274 0.0261
[2.21]** [2.23]** [2.15]**
Tenure 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
[3.10]*** [3.12]*** [2.91]**
Tenure2 0 0 0
[2.37]** [2.40]** [2.22]**
Tenure : noresponse 0.1307 0.1316 0.129
[3.36]*** [3.37]*** [3.24]***
ISCED: high -0.0224 -0.0225 -0.0702
[0.74] [0.74] [1.66]
ISCED: med -0.006 -0.0056 -0.0524
[0.16] [0.15] [1.09]
FirmSize :< 25 -0.0754 -0.0757 -0.0769
[2.80]** [2.85]** [2.88]**
FirmSize : 25 ¡ 100 -0.0378 -0.0381 -0.0384
[1.85]* [1.90]* [1.88]*
FirmSize : 100 ¡ 1000 -0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0041
[0.15] [0.16] [0.20]
Firm : public 0.0724 0.0737 0.0719
[0.89] [0.91] [0.87]
Firm : unknownowner -0.1061 -0.1013 -0.1174
[6.21]*** [6.44]*** [7.41]***
Industry : Output 0.0096 0.0133 0.0133
[0.87] [1.28] [1.33]




OSS £ ISCED : high 0.045
[2.65]**
OSS £ ISCED : med -0.0114
[3.29]***




OSM £ ISCED : high -0.0027
[0.66]
OSM £ ISCED : med -0.0085
[2.29]**
OSM £ ISCED : low -0.0195
[4.43]***
Constant 1.167 0.9738 1.0105
[1.77]* [1.57] [1.68]
Observations 5775 5775 5775
R2 0.82 0.82 0.83
Occupation Controls YES YES YES
Individual Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Region Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES




Note: t-statistics in brackets, *** signi¯cant at 1%,** at 5%, * at 10%. Default categories: Age :> 50,
ISCED:low, FirmSize :> 1000.
13Table 5: Cumulated wage e®ects of increased o®shoring, at 1992 median wages
High-Skilled Medium-Skilled Low-Skilled
Median hourly wage (1992)
9.44 7.73 4.92
Coe±cient, Table 4, Column III
OSS 0.05 -0.01 -0.01
OSM 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Percentage Point Change, 1992-2004
OSS=1.57
OSM=0.46
Cumulated yearly wage change in GBP (1732 work hours)
OSS 1152.51 -238.91 -176.02
OSM 0.00 -52.88 -77.19
OSS+OSM 1152.51 -291.78 -253.21
Note: assumed 1732 annual work hours in 1992 according to OECD (2008, Factbook)
14